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         NOT PRECEDENTIAL 
 
UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS 
FOR THE THIRD CIRCUIT 
___________ 
 
No. 12-3783 
___________ 
 
FRANCISCO MEDINA VALDEZ, 
                                                               Petitioner 
 
v. 
 
ATTORNEY GENERAL OF THE UNITED STATES OF AMERICA, 
                                                               Respondent  
____________________________________ 
 
On Petition for Review of an Order of the 
Board of Immigration Appeals 
(Agency No. A030-106-192) 
Immigration Judge:  Honorable Margaret R. Reichenberg 
____________________________________ 
 
Submitted Pursuant to Third Circuit LAR 34.1(a) 
March 22, 2013 
Before:  FUENTES, VANASKIE and VAN ANTWERPEN, Circuit Judges 
 
(Opinion filed: March 25, 2013) 
___________ 
 
OPINION 
___________ 
 
PER CURIAM 
 Francisco Medina Valdez is a native and citizen of the Dominican Republic who 
was admitted to the United States as a lawful permanent resident in November 1970.  
Over the course of the next forty years, he sustained convictions for the following 
offenses: (1) on November 5, 1986, second degree assault in violation of New York Penal 
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Law § 120.05; (2) on January 27, 1988, possession of a controlled substance (cocaine) in 
violation of 21 U.S.C. § 3147; (3) on February 22, 1991, attempted criminal possession 
of stolen property in violation of New York Penal Law §§ 110 and 165.50; and (4) on 
September 17, 2010, making a false statement on a passport application in violation of 18 
U.S.C. § 1542. 
In June 2011, the Department of Homeland Security (DHS) issued a Notice to 
Appear charging Medina with removal under: (1) 8 U.S.C. § 1227(a)(2)(A)(ii), as an 
alien convicted of two crimes involving moral turpitude (CIMT) not arising out of a 
single scheme of criminal misconduct; (2) 8 U.S.C. § 1227(a)(2)(B)(i), as an alien 
convicted of a violation of a law relating to a controlled substance; and (3) 8 U.S.C. 
§ 1227(a)(2)(A)(iii), as an alien convicted of a crime of violence, which is an aggravated 
felony, see 8 U.S.C. § 1101(a)(43)(F).  During the August 2011 calendar hearing, Medina 
admitted the factual allegations in the Notice to Appear, and conceded the first two 
removal charges.  He denied only the aggravated felony charge, arguing that the Illegal 
Immigration Reform and Immigrant Relief Act of 1996 (IIRIRA), which reduced, from 
five years to one, the minimum term of imprisonment necessary for a crime of violence to 
qualify as an aggravated felony, should not apply retroactively to his 1986 assault 
conviction, for which he was sentenced to one year in prison.    
DHS subsequently lodged an additional charge of removal against Medina, 
alleging that he was an alien convicted of an aggravated felony theft offense based on his 
1991 conviction.  See 8 U.S.C. §§ 1227(a)(2)(A)(iii); 1101(a)(43)(G).  Medina applied 
for asylum, withholding of removal, and protection under the Convention Against 
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Torture (CAT), claiming that he would be persecuted if forced to return to the Dominican 
Republic because: (1) a neighbor with whom Medina was feuding threatened to contact a 
sergeant in their home country to have Medina killed; and (2) the police in the Dominican 
Republic persecute criminal deportees.  He also sought cancellation of removal under 8 
U.S.C. § 1229b(a), and a waiver of inadmissibility under former § 1182(c).   
Following a hearing, the Immigration Judge (IJ) found that DHS had proved its 
charges against Medina; that he was ineligible for asylum or withholding of removal 
because his convictions for assault and theft are “particularly serious crime[s],” see 8 
U.S.C. §§ 1158(b)(2)(A)(ii), 1231(b)(3)(B)(ii) & (b)(3)(B) (last paragraph); that he failed 
to meet his burden of showing eligibility for deferral of removal under the CAT because 
the evidence did not suggest a likelihood of torture, see 8 C.F.R. § 1208.16(c)(2); that his 
2010 conviction for passport fraud renders him ineligible for relief under former 
§ 1182(c), see 8 C.F.R. § 1212.3(h)(3); and that he is not eligible for cancellation of 
removal because he was convicted of aggravated felonies in 1986 and 1991, see 8 U.S.C. 
§§ 1229b(a)(3), 1101(a)(43)(F), (G).  Upon administrative review, the BIA affirmed the 
IJ‟s decision and dismissed the appeal.  This pro se petition for review followed.               
Medina‟s primary argument on appeal is that the BIA erred in determining that he 
failed to demonstrate eligibility for relief under the CAT.
1
  To be eligible for such relief, 
Medina was required to show that it is more likely than not that he would be tortured if 
                                              
1
 To the extent that Medina argues that the BIA erred in making an adverse credibility 
determination, in requiring corroborating evidence, and in relying on the “specific intent 
doctrine,” (Br. 11-15), we note that the BIA‟s decision does not make reference to any of 
these considerations.      
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removed to the Dominican Republic.  See 8 C.F.R. § 1208.16(c)(2).  “Torture” consists 
of the intentional infliction of “severe pain or suffering . . . by or at the instigation of or 
with the consent or acquiescence of a public official or other person acting in an official 
capacity.”  8 C.F.R. § 1208.18(a)(1).  At his removal hearing, Medina testified that his 
neighbor, Mr. Perez, accused him of telling Mr. Perez‟s wife that he had been unfaithful, 
and threatened to contact a relative who is a sergeant in the Dominican Republic to have 
Medina killed.  Medina further testified that he is likely to be singled out for torture 
because of his status as a criminal deportee.   
The BIA correctly concluded that Medina failed to demonstrate that he was 
eligible for CAT relief.
2
  As the BIA explained, Medina‟s fears concerning Mr. Perez‟s 
relative are insufficient to demonstrate a likelihood of torture; Mr. Perez made the threat 
only once in the heat of an argument, and Medina did not provide the agency with any 
evidence verifying the identity of the alleged relative.  With respect to Medina‟s fear that 
he would be tortured because of his status as a criminal deportee, we note that the country 
conditions evidence does not indicate that the Dominican government targets deportees 
for torture.        
Medina also argues that the BIA erred in deeming him ineligible for cancellation  
                                                                                                                                                  
 
2
 We have jurisdiction to review the application of the law governing CAT protection to 
the undisputed facts.  Cf. Silva–Rengifo v. Att‟y Gen., 473 F.3d 58, 63 (3d Cir. 2007) 
(citing Kamara v. Att‟y Gen., 420 F.3d 202, 211 (3d Cir. 2005), for the proposition that 
the “jurisdictional grant regarding appeals by aggravated felons extends not just to legal 
determinations but also to application of law to facts”). 
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of removal under 8 U.S.C. § 1229b(a) on the ground that he had been convicted of two 
“aggravated felon[ies],” as that term is defined in 8 U.S.C. §§ 1101(a)(43)(F) and (G), 
because those definitions, which he claims were amended by the IIRIRA in 1996, cannot 
be applied retroactively to crimes committed beforehand.
3
  This argument is, however, 
foreclosed by our decision in Biskupski v. Att‟y Gen., 503 F.3d 274, 278 (3d Cir. 2007) 
(explaining that “Congress expressly mandated that the changes made to the term 
„aggravated felony‟ in 8 U.S.C. § 1101(a)(43)” applied to crimes committed before the 
enactment of IIRIRA).
4
  
Medina does not meaningfully challenge any other aspect of the BIA‟s decision on 
appeal.  Accordingly, we will deny the petition for review.  
 
                                              
3
 Although we generally lack jurisdiction to review final orders of removal against an 
alien removable as an aggravated felon, we retain jurisdiction to review questions of law.  
8 U.S.C. § 1252(a)(2)(D).  Whether a statute has retroactive application and issues of 
statutory construction are questions of law over which we exercise plenary review.  See 
Park v. Att‟y Gen., 472 F.3d 66, 70-71 (3d Cir. 2006).   
 
4
 To the extent that Medina purports to challenge the BIA‟s determination that he was 
ineligible for asylum and withholding of removal because he had been convicted of a 
“particularly serious crime,” see 8 U.S.C. §§ 1158(b)(2)(A)(ii) & (b)(2)(B)(i); 
§§ 1231(b)(3)(B)(ii) & (b)(3)(B) (last paragraph), we note that he failed to present this 
argument to the BIA.  Therefore, we lack jurisdiction to review it.  See 8 U.S.C. 
§ 1252(d)(1).  
